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Abstract
The difference between Hermann Cohen’s systematic philosophy and his philosophy 
of  religion can be determined via the logical “Judgment of  Contradiction,” viewed 
as an “Authority of  Annihilation.” In Cohen’s Logic of  Pure Knowledge the “Judgment 
of  Contradiction” acts as a “means of  protection” against “falsifications” that may 
have arisen on the pathway through the previous judgments of  “origin” and “iden-
tity.” Cohen thematizes these operations in his Religion of  Reason Out of  the Sources of  
Judaism, too. However, there they do not form the grounding for natural science 
but rather for the knowledge of  nature as creation in a strict correlation to God’s 
uniqueness. Any admixture between God and nature is the falseness that must be 
excluded via the “Authority of  Annihilation.” The Being of  God places the world 
over against the possibility of  its own radical Non-Being. Yet at the same time, a 
second mode of  Negation, a relative Nothing providing continuity for the world’s 
being-there (Dasein), grounded in the “Logic of  Origin,” retains its validity. In 
Cohen’s view a Creation “in the beginning” stands side by side with a continuous 
“renewal of  the world” (hiddush ha-‘olam).
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Since the beginning of  research on Hermann Cohen, the difference 
between his systematic philosophy and his philosophy of  religion has 
been a topic of  much discussion. My thesis is as follows: The 
“Judgment of  Contradiction” within Cohen’s Logic of  Pure Knowledge 
(Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, LrE),1 viewed as an “Authority of  Annihilation, 
of  making into Nothing,” a Vernichtungs-Instanz (LrE 106–107), creates 
* An earlier version of  this essay was published in Verneinung, Andersheit und 
Unendlichkeit im Neukantianismus, ed. Pierfrancesco Fiorato (Würzburg: Königshausen 
& Neumann, 2008), 47–67.
1 Cohen’s Logic is cited from Logik der reinen Erkenntnis (2nd ed., 1914), vol. 6 of  
Werke, ed. H. Holzhey et al. (Hildesheim: Olms, 1977– ).
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the logical difference between two ways of  formulating the method-
ological springboard of  Cohen’s thought, the logic of  “origin.”2 
Cohen thematizes his logic of  origin twice: once as a principle of  
scientific knowledge of  nature, in his Logic, and once as the foundation 
of  a religious concept of  nature, i.e., of  nature as the Creation of  
God. This latter ultimately flows into his posthumous Religion of  
Reason Out of  the Sources of  Judaism (RoR).3 I argue that via the con-
cept of  Annihilation, the difference between the two formulations 
can be precisely expressed in methodological terms. First I shall 
examine the role of  this “Authority of  Annihilation” in the Logic of  
Pure Knowledge. Second, I explore its significance in the framework 
of  the philosophy of  religion.
I. Logic of  Pure Knowledge
Let us look at the meaning of  Vernichtungs-Instanz in the Logic of  Pure 
Knowledge. On the analogy of  Kant’s “Synthetic Principles of  Pure 
Understanding” within the Critique of  Pure Reason, Cohen organized 
his Logic as a twelvefold chain of  “Judgments” (instead of  categories4) 
whose coordinated interplay is meant to lay the foundation of  the 
scientific knowledge of  nature. “The Judgment of  Contradiction” is 
the third of  the three “Judgments of  the Laws of  Thought” at the 
beginning of  the Logic. First comes the “Judgment of  Origin.” This 
concerns the disposition of  what Cohen calls a “question.”5 Such a 
question arises when a context of  knowledge that has become self-
evident turns doubtful. This occurs when, e.g., certain “claims” 
2 For an in-depth introduction to the principle of  origin, see Werner Flach, 
“Cohen’s Ursprungsdenken,” in Hermann Cohen’s Critical Idealism, ed. Reinier Munk 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 41–65.
3 Hermann Cohen, Religion of  Reason Out of  the Sources of  Judaism, trans. Simon 
Kaplan (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1972) [RoR]; idem, Religion der Vernunft aus den 
Quellen des Judentums, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Kauffmann, 1929) [RV].
4 Cf. Andrea Poma, The Critical Philosophy of  Hermann Cohen (Albany: State 
University of  New York Press, 1997), 86–88.
5 On this complex, see Pierfrancesco Fiorato, “Il logos della domanda: Pensiero 
dell’Origine e problematologia,” in Unità della ragione e modi dell’esperienza. Hermann 
Cohen e il neokantismo, ed. Gian Paolo Cammarota (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 
2009), 175–188; see esp. section 2, 177–180, on the form of  question as a “kind 
of  judgment” (LrE 83).
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appear, such as a result of  a sensation,6 claims that cannot find a 
place in the canon of  what was previous, i.e., claims that are not 
determined within its relations. That generates an occasion to rein-
terrogate the knowledge context. To shape such interrogation as a 
fundamental act of  thinking is the content of  the “Judgment of  
Origin.” As part of  this process, thinking as a whole turns away 
from what has become self-evident, naturalized, and seemingly 
given, in the direction of  what Cohen calls a “Nothing.”
But this Nothing, in which departure is taken from the seemingly 
given, is not an absolute Nothing but rather a relative one. It is 
relative in regard to a task that is necessarily bound up with the act 
of  turning away, because turning away only has meaning and pur-
pose if  a new context of  knowledge is looked at and constituted, 
something different from what was previously known.7 So the turn-
ing away to a “relative Nothing” leads to a turning around from this 
Nothing toward a reversal, or a turning back of  the turning away: 
an “Umkehr der Abkehr”8 back in the direction toward something—
not the previous something, but rather a new process of  grounding. 
The generation of  this new grounding forms the content of  the 
thinking of  Origin. The precisely observed point of  turning around 
and reversal, toward the new context, the genesis of  a further 
 determinable beginning of  thought as such, is called by Cohen “the 
Judgment of  Origin.” For that reason, what arises is not an already 
formulated determined ‘A’ but rather an ‘X’ lying ‘before it.’ (LrE 83). 
What comes to pass in the “Judgment of  Origin” is a purely deter-
minable “X,” a something that is beginning—a metaxy, to use Plato’s 
term: a “thought in between” (LrE 104).9
Second, this Judgment is followed by the “Judgment of  Identity.” 
Here, what previously appears to hover in pure determinability is 
grasped and condensed through a gesture of  repetition, of  re- 
flection, into a self-referent determinate “A.” The proposition that 
determines and expresses this is “A is A” (LrE 95). The act of  think-
ing that this proposition symbolizes is in the strictest sense a 
6 On the “claim of  sensation,” an example of  a central motif  in thought that 
“all categories tend to answer,” see LrE 434ff. and passim; quotation on 437.
7 This leads to a purely “logical” concept of  the future; see LrE 63–64.
8 See Jakob Gordin, Untersuchungen zur Theorie des unendlichen Urteils (Berlin: 
Akademie-Verlag, 1929), 94–103 at 99.
9 See Pierfrancesco Fiorato, Geschichtliche Ewigkeit. Ursprung und Zeitlichkeit in der 
Philosophie Hermann Cohens (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1993), 60–66.
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 non-empty tautology, a fortifying and formation of  determination 
via selfness (Selbigkeit).10 Two errors in particular should be avoided 
here. First, one must not translate the formula “A = A,” used inter 
alia by Fichte, into literal logic and read it as a statement of  equa-
tion “A = (equals) A.” “Equality” in Cohen’s view presupposes math-
ematics and belongs to the logic of  the object.11 However, here we 
are still in its antechamber, and with “identity” can discuss only the 
first step of  a determination. Therefore Cohen’s formula “A is A” 
must not be mixed up with ambivalent concepts of  “A = A.” 
Second, we have to avoid thinking that “A is A” already conceptual-
izes a connection between two different determinations, such as in 
the sense of  a predication.12 What we have here is exclusively an 
assurance, the affirmation of  a determination as such, though still 
devoid of  any relation to what is distinguished as different. This 
second consideration is important for the subsequent thoughts.
The affirmation as the formation of  an “A” must be joined, as 
Cohen sees it, by a third act of  Judgment. The “A” requires a 
“means of  protection” vis-à-vis “falsifications of  its content.” The 
“Judgment of  Contradiction” provides this protection in the form 
of  an “Authority of  Annihilation” (LrE 106). If  the identity is under-
stood as a dedicatio, a positive bestowal or ‘conferment’ of  a deter-
mination—Cohen cites the Neo-Platonist Apuleius13—then negation 
emerges as an abdication, as the ‘rejection’ of  a determination. He 
writes: “More significant than dedicatio is the word abdicatio. And we 
are probably not mistaken in supposing that the latter likely led to 
the former” (LrE 106). So the “Judgment of  Contradiction” appears 
in a certain respect to precede the Judgment of  Identity. At the same 
time, Cohen links it with strong pathos: “For thought, between A 
and a non-identical A there is no reconciliation. It has to become 
Nothing, rather to be destroyed into Nothing, so that a Judgment of  
its content can only be implemented in this direction. It is the vital 
issue of  Judgment that it be able to establish this Authority in itself, 
the ‘Authority of  Annihilation’” (LrE 107).14 Cohen calls the  establishment 
10 See LrE 94.
11 See LrE 102 and 482–486.
12 See LrE 97–100.
13 See LrE 101.
14 On the great “weight” that Cohen accords negation as annihilation, see the 
comments by Paul Natorp in his letter to Albert Görland, November 21, 1902; see 
Helmut Holzhey, Cohen und Natorp, 2 vols. (Basel: Schwabe, 1986), 2:301–302.
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of  this Authority itself  a law: in the sense in which Identity is a “Law 
of  Thought of  truth,” Contradiction and Annihilation form a 
“Law of  Thought of  untruth” (LrE 115). This does not serve, for 
example, to establish knowledge of  error: “That would be psycho-
logical.” No: “For logic there exists what is false” (LrE 115, my emph.). 
Untruth must, like truth, come to validity in a ‘positive’ form—in 
order to be considered destroyed.
Where does this strong emphasis derive from? What in particular 
does it mean here when Cohen speaks about the “Judgment of  a 
content” that has not come about at all? For, a content in the sense 
of  a determination according to the type of  “A” is supposed to be 
specifically excluded by Annihilation. So basically a “Judgment of  a 
content” cannot come to pass. For that reason, Cohen also speaks 
of  a “Judgment before the Judgment” (LrE 106); and he calls this 
“Judgment before the Judgment”—in three different places, and thus 
very emphatically—the “activity of  Judgment” (LrE 107, 108, 116). 
“It is the Judgment itself  that denies this right and value to a  content 
that presumes to become the content of  a Judgment” (LrE 107).
But what is such a presuming content? This question leads us 
back to the plane of  the “Judgment of  Origin,” because a “content 
that presumes to become the content of  the Judgment,” yet without 
achieving that, can at best be thematized ‘before’ Identity, i.e., only 
on the plane of  the determinable that is in the process of  coming 
into being. Correspondingly, Cohen writes: “There is no non-A, 
there can be no non-A that, in contrast with the Nothing of  the 
Origin, might have a closed content” (LrE 107). To be sure, the 
question of  the ‘non-A’ arises only after the A has become 
 thematic—to that extent, Contradiction comes ‘after’ Identity, and 
the “sequence of  its use must not be altered and thus confounded” 
(LrE 120). But the plane on which the ‘non-A’ becomes manifest as 
something different lies ‘before’ Identity, namely, with the Nothing 
of  Origin. The ‘closed character’ of  a content is already formed in 
the initial question, in that very first “kind of  a Judgment,” and to 
refuse closedness is the Annihilation of  the ‘non-A.’ We thus find 
ourselves on the level of  the laying of  the foundation of  the first 
“Judgment of  the Laws of  Thought.” Helmut Holzhey correctly 
notes that the principle of  Contradiction is “directly connected with 
the introduction of  the principle of  Origin.”15
15 Holzhey, Cohen und Natorp, 2:238.
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From this it follows that no non-identical can be presupposed that 
might then be destroyed in a second step. The difference of  some-
thing admissible over against the non-admissible is to be determined 
at the genesis of  the beginning of  the Judgment itself. But where 
does the claim of  something non-admissible derive from? The ques-
tion about the non-A arises, as stated, only ‘after’ Identity—even if  
the answer must be sought ‘before.’ But one may ask how this 
pointed question in Cohen can arise in the first place. Is not 
“Identity” sufficient to ensure the determination? We have, after all, 
as yet no multiplicity. All that is of  concern here is the beginning of  
determination as such, and one would assume that an act of  assur-
ance that (and this is what “Identity” means) inaugurates ex definitione 
the validity of  a substrate formulated in selfhood would be sufficient. 
Why is there in addition this protection via Annihilation? Falsity can 
threaten an act of  determination in the form of  contradictory 
predications or formations of  relation, but then we are in a quite 
‘later’ stage of  the formation of  Judgment. The principle of  the 
excluded Contradiction was indeed generally understood to deter-
mine an already existing substrate of  determination—i.e., it gives it 
a precise place within a conceptual system as a product of  differen-
tiating the predicate. Thus, the Identity of  an A can be positively 
further determined by the predicates a, b, c, and so forth. At the 
same time, on the other hand, the A is protected from contradictions 
by excluding from it the predicates α, β, γ, and so forth, if  positive 
predication there would lead to a contradiction. To do this for all 
predications that come into question means forming a content: it 
takes on shape as a concept within a system.
Cohen also discusses this process of  a determining, ultimately 
complete and total disjunction in his Logic, but not until the ninth 
Judgment, the “Judgment of  Concept.”16 There, in the so-called 
“Law of  Thought of  the system,” he is concerned once again with 
“truth,” but now “in relation to the content and meaning of  the 
concepts that join together within it” (LrE 395). But it is precisely 
in these linkages joining together that one finds “the difference 
between the system of  truth and the truth of  Identity” (LrE 395, my 
emphasis): in Jakob Gordin’s words, a “non-P” determined by a pred-
icate is “not a negation of  the attempt to injure P in its identity”—that 
16 See LrE 382–386, 392–396; on the “disjunctive conclusion” as a method-
ological principle of  research, see 577–579; Gordin, Untersuchungen, 75–78.
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would be a non-A that should be destroyed; rather, it is a “symbol 
of  the exclusion of  P.”17 In this way, negation here appears as an 
aspect for determining the content. In comparison with the principle 
of  Annihilation on the plane of  the logic of  principles, that is a 
concept of  Contradiction that is almost weak, but in any case dif-
ferent. In looking at the “Judgment of  Contradiction,” it would 
appear that Cohen was locating his identical approach A in the 
center of  a defensive constellation—as if  thought had to organize a 
phalanx of  defense and annihilation, in whose center, indeed by 
means of  which, the identical A establishes itself. Cohen evidently 
saw pure knowledge threatened by a fundamental danger already in 
its first beginnings. However, I doubt that this danger has an ade-
quate exact meaning in the Logic of  Pure Knowledge.
II. Philosophy of  Religion
A different picture emerges if  we look at Cohen’s philosophy of  
religion. There, from the very beginning, what is central is the pro-
tective formation, or rather the formation facilitated by protection, 
of  a content that only becomes thinkable at all via the Annihilation 
of  non-A, namely the concept of  God. But as will become apparent, 
God himself  is not A, whose Identity is now to be determined. 
Rather here, as in Cohen’s Logic, the focus is on nature. However, 
this is a nature, and thus an A, that is thought in correlation to God, 
namely as his Creation. It concerns nature as something created. 
The A to be determined is thus, methodologically speaking, the cor-
relation between nature and God that arises in nature. But initially, 
the prerequisite for this is an exact separation between the two cor-
relates. So in the beginning, there is the draft or projection of  an 
idea of  God in the form of  a radical non-nature, and nature as a 
radical non-divinity. The non-A to be destroyed is both in a unity: 
the concrete presumption of  a God in the shape of  nature, and a 
theomorphic nature. God and nature commingled—repeatedly excoriated 
by Cohen as “pantheism”—is the falsehood which must expressly 
and without surcease be termed untruth. This protection of  the 
17 Gordin, Untersuchungen, 77. For a more recent approach that conceives of  the 
principle of  Contradiction in a similar sense as a “determinant of  determination,” 
see Werner Flach, Erkenntniskritik, Logik, Methodologie. Grundzüge der Erkenntnislehre 
(Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1994), 275–284.
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correlation A demands that the “Authority of  Annihilation” have its 
own effect on the plane of  the logic of  Origin. In the philosophy of  
religion, we have a logic of  Origin that can be successfully set in 
motion only through destroying a non-A.
Religion of  Reason Out of  the Sources of  Judaism takes this into account 
already in the sequencing of  its chapters. The first chapter, on 
“God’s uniqueness,” presents a God whom Cohen appropriates from 
Jewish tradition, in particular the Hebrew Bible, while giving at the 
same time a philosophical interpretation of  that tradition. Central 
here is the narrative of  revelation to Moses in the burning bush. 
The decisive phrase God uses here about himself  is, in Cohen’s 
translation: “I am that I am.”18 Through this statement, the unique 
God as foundational Being is introduced into the discussion of  the 
philosophy of  religion from the sources of  Judaism, even if  here, at 
the beginning of  the book, this inclusion cannot yet be adequately 
justified; that will not be done until the discussion of  sin and recon-
ciliation. This God, as expressed by “unique,” is something incom-
parable vis-à-vis all else that is. Thus Cohen arrives at the strong 
thesis that God and only God has Being. Contrasted with that, the 
world is Non-Being; it is a “Being-there,” a “Dasein” or “Becoming.”19 
Thus, already here the determinable something-of-Creation emerges, 
the predecessor X to the correlation A, via a separation between 
Being and Non-Being, and via the apportioning of  these aspects of  
contrast and antagonism to one of  the two correlates.
The topic of  chapter 2, “Service of  Images,” is how to protect 
the conceptual religious-philosophical complex that is indicated by 
the one and only Being of  God from possible falsification. The 
exclusion of  any basis for comparability with anything at or in the 
world is anchored concretely in a religious manner.20 Cohen quotes 
again from the Hebrew Bible, and in particular the prophets’ criti-
cism of  the customary practice of  sacrifice, e.g., their criticism of  
humans’ belief  that they are able to enter a relation of  exchange or 
even of  image Creation with God. This critique is the religious 
18 Exod 3:14; see Cohen, Der Begriff  der Religion im System der Philosophie (1915), 
vol. 10 of  Werke, 21; RoR 42 (RV 49: “Ich bin, der ich bin”).
19 RoR 44–45 (RV 51–52: “Dasein”), RoR 60, 65–66 (RV 69–70, 75–76: 
“Werden”), and passim.
20 Cf. Kenneth Seeskin, “Hermann Cohen on Idol Worship,” in “Religion of  
Reason Out of  the Sources of  Judaism.” Tradition and the Concept of  Origin in Hermann 
Cohen’s Later Work, ed. Helmut Holzhey, Gabriel Motzkin, and Hartwig Wiedebach 
(Hildesheim: Olms, 2000), 107–116.
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pendant to the logical “Authority of  Annihilation.” It is, if  you will, 
the religious figure or shape of  the Judgment of  Annihilation, the 
“protection” of  the uniqueness from any analogy to knowledge of  
nature, and any admixture.
Chapter 3, “Creation,” then carries out the logic of  Origin pre-
pared in this manner as the logic of  Creation. It is the actual paral-
lel to the “Judgment of  Origin” in the Logic of  Pure Knowledge. Here 
the focal point is the path of  thought toward A as something cre-
ated. The character of  being something created must already be 
granted to the purely determinable X that lies ‘before’ this. How 
then do Negation and/or Annihilation shape up here, where the 
correlation to nature turns thematic over and beyond mere unique-
ness? What does it mean to think of  Creation as a correlation of  
two incomparabilities? In order to illustrate this in contrast with the 
foundation of  natural science, I go back to a form of  Judgment that 
Cohen mentions both in the Logic of  Pure Knowledge and in Religion of  
Reason, namely the so-called “infinite Judgment.”21 I will limit myself  
here to a single aspect that shows how, on the one hand, this 
 complex Judgment type serves to lay the systematic-philosophical 
foundation, and on the other hand, characteristically modified, the 
Creation-logical foundation. Initially it has to be made clear how 
the two modes resemble each other.
To this end, it must first be clarified in what aspects the two 
modes are the same. Both in the grounding of  natural science and 
in the philosophy of  religion, the infinite Judgment can be under-
stand as a “negation of  privation.” How that should be conceived 
will soon be apparent. The decisive difference will then lie in the 
respective gesture of  thought through which privation is negated in 
one case or another. It depends on the differing ontological status 
that the privative element has in connection with scientific knowl-
edge, on the one hand, and in the question of  Creation on the 
other. Let us take as an example the problem of  immortality, in 
Cohen’s view a subject subsumed under ethics. On first glance, that 
would appear to be unfavorable. He alludes to the problem of  
immortality in his Ethics of  Pure Will (Ethik des reinen Willens) but does 
21 LrE 87–90, passim; RoR 62–63, 66 (RV 72, 76); in addition, see Cohen, Kants 
Theorie der Erfahrung (3rd ed., 1918), Werke, 1.1:790. See also Holzhey, Cohen und 
Natorp, 1:193–197; he states that in the LrE, there is “notably little” comment on 
the infinite Judgment; it has been “supplanted” by the “Origin of  Judgment” 
(195).
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not make it a constitutive element. His reserve springs from the fact 
that due to methodological reasons, a “hypothesis [. . .] cannot be 
carried out for the immortality of  the individual soul” (Ethik 435–
436).22 Nonetheless, and this is decisive at the moment, he treats it, 
following the paradigm of  Kant,23 as an example of  the infinite 
Judgment, in part because the linguistic form of  the concept 
“immortality” makes the idea of  Judgment vivid.24
The first question is about the concept of  the human being. Here 
too, following the above sketch of  the Judgment of  Origin, the 
method is to proceed from this question to a philosophically precise 
problem. So initially there is a turning away from the ostensible 
givenness of  what is human to a (as we now can say) Nothing of  the 
human being. But this only occurs in order, in a renewed reversal 
of  course, to leave behind this Nothing as well, moving toward a 
determination of  the human being. The determination is intended 
to render possible a new insight, a difference contrasting with the 
ostensible givenness, indeed with all givenness. The question involves 
the possibility of  reconstructing the human being as an idea. If  now 
human immortality is in particular the problem we proceed from, 
the path of  a double reversal—i.e., this special kind of  double 
negation—aims to understand the human being via the idea of  his 
immortality. Within it, we would have the ideal determination of  the 
human being, as related to the initial problem as point of  departure; 
and the task of  ethics, conceived as the “doctrine of  the human 
being” (Ethik 1), would now be to teach the human as an immortal 
being, and to assess volition and action from that vantage. But mor-
tality doesn’t disappear in this way as a feature of  human life—
rather, it now appears as a deficiency in a precise and positive sense 
vis-à-vis the idea of  immortality.
It is this positive concept of  deficiency that shapes mortality into a 
philosophical problem. Mortality takes on the character of  a priva-
tion, in Aristotelian terms a steresis.25 It is immaterial here whether 
22 See Wiedebach, “Unsterblichkeit und Auferstehung im Denken Hermann 
Cohens,” in “Religion of  Reason Out of  the Sources of  Judaism.” Tradition and the Concept 
of  Origin, 431–457, here at 436.
23 See Kant, Logik (ed. Jäsche), §22, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Preußische 
Akademie der Wissenschaften [Akademie-Ausgabe] (Berlin: Reimer, 1900– ), 
9:103–104.
24 See LrE 88–89. 
25 See Cohen, “Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis” (1908), in Kleinere Schriften 
IV, vol. 15 of  Werke, 212; in general, see Johannes Fritsche, “Privation,” in Historisches 
Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Basel: Schwabe, 1989), 7:1378–1383, here at 1378–1379.
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each individual case of  a privation can be expressed in language 
through an alpha privativum or by the prefix ‘in-’ (Latin) or ‘un-’ 
(English, German). Cohen challenges that expressly in the Religion of  
Reason.26 It is only a question of  the logical content. Seen from that 
circumstance, immortality appears as the “negation of  privation,” 
brought about by the Judgment of  Origin. And we can go so far as 
to say: only from this negation of  privation do we see deficiency, 
which human mortality represents, at all. Immortality itself  becomes 
the “Origin of  mortality.”27 So to conceive of  the latter as a problem 
thus presupposes that one has already entered the metaxy, the 
‘between’ of  a new approach. Because only from the vantage of  this 
new approach does the deficiency become visible. One clearly sees 
that deficiency here could not (and should not) be completely 
negated, destroyed. It must via negationis flow into the idea of  the 
human being and be recognized there. The human being then is 
positively determined and defined in two respects: on the one hand, 
privatively, as a mortal creature; on the other, ideally, as an immor-
tal creature. The task of  systematic foundation is to bring both sides 
into a unity.
That does not hold when it comes to the idea of  God. In Cohen’s 
view, God lacks any privative aspect. Divine Being and Natural 
Being exclude each other. Consequently, to think the negation of  
privation, i.e., the infinite Judgment or “Judgment of  Origin” in 
relation to the correlation of  God and nature, results in a different 
distribution of  deficiency and ideality than in connection with the 
knowledge of  nature in the framework of  systemic logic, or the 
knowledge of  man in the framework of  the Ethik des reinen Willens.28 
When Cohen, echoing Maimonides, states that God is not “inert,”29 
then this is likewise the negation of  a privation. But the privation 
must not be preserved as a positive aspect of  determination in the 
concept of  God. What is exclusively involved here is the destruction 
of  falsity. To wish to associate God in any way with the attribute 
“inert” would be precisely that presumed content of  a Judgment 
26 Using an example from Maimonides; see RoR 64 (RV 73).
27 Gordin, Untersuchungen, 123; on the difference with Kant, see 121–124.
28 An example from natural philosophy is Democritus’s concept of  the atom, 
whose ideality came into being “to defend against splitting” (LrE 87).
29 RoR 64 (RV 73). Cf. Cohen, “Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis,” Werke, 
15:220: God is “nicht unmächtig [not lacking in might],” according to Maimonides, 
Guide of  the Perplexed, part 1, chap. 58; in the French translation by Salomon Munk 
(3 vols.; Paris: A. Franck, 1856–1866) which Cohen used, “il n’est pas impuissant” 
(1:244).
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against which the “Judgment of  Contradiction” is directed. This act 
of  Judgment belongs directly at the beginning of  religious philoso-
phizing and also in the preliminaries of  the A that now must be 
generated. “When God becomes cognizable through the attribute 
of  non-inertia, he becomes cognizable as Creator, Creation is included 
in his concept. [. . .] This Creation rather means the Being of  God, 
which is the Being of  Origin.”30
But as we have seen, the A is a correlation A; so here too nature, 
but as a created nature. Viewed from the vantage of  God, A is not 
exclusively God himself, but rather his position in correlation to 
something to which he is conceived as impacting on as a uniqueness. 
And in this way it becomes clear how in religion deficiency and 
ideality can be fused into a unity in their own way. God’s “non-in-
ertia” is the ideality before which the world as deficiency becomes 
problematic. To repeat: In the logic of  Creation, unlike the logic of  
natural science, we have the sharp ontological separation between 
Being and Being-there, existence, between God and world. And the 
separation is brought about and protected to a decisive degree 
through the “Authority of  Annihilation” of  the Judgment of  
Contradiction. Two things relevant to the question of  Nothing 
derive from this position when it is considered against the backdrop 
of  the logic of  Origin discussed earlier. On the one hand, the cor-
relation A of  the logic of  Creation must establish itself  indirectly, 
by a detour via a relative Nothing. Here too we have a question that 
proceeds from a world context that has become commonsensical, 
self-evident; it then turns from that, and returning again, provides 
the basis anew for the world context. The inertia ascribed to the 
world should be judged via the non-inertia of  God, and should be 
integrated into a creative becoming. This relative Nothing of  Origin 
is also the essential methodological springboard for the dynamics of  
Creation. And because Cohen thinks Divine uniqueness is identical 
with Creation, he also sees it in identity with this Nothing: the 
Nothing that is relative from the correlation A becomes identical 
with the Being of  God. But precisely this Being as uniqueness 
demands, on the other hand, the Annihilation of  all presumed con-
tent, which contaminates the determination of  the correlation with 
false analogies and admixture. So the relative Nothing of  Origin is 
directly accompanied by a non-relative Annihilation. What appears in 
30 My translation, from RV 75 (cf. RoR 65).
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the logic of  Creation as Nothing is thus a binary: on the one hand, 
the relative Nothing of  the logic of  Origin, and on the other, a 
Nothing that appears in pure Annihilation, a “Non-Being that is 
absolutely non-existent,” as Gordin phrases it.31
So we find that corresponding to the correlation between God 
and the nature of  Creation is a second correlation, between the 
relative Nothing of  Origin and the absolute Nothing of  separation. 
In the double motion of  this double Nothing, as conceived in 
thought, the X determinable in religious term arises. It develops into 
the self-identical A of  created nature. In this double movement of  
thought of  Nothing, that “activity of  Judgment” takes on a form 
that is characterized as the “Judgment of  Contradiction” in the Logic 
of  Pure Knowledge. In this act, this activity of  Judgment, the relative 
Nothing of  Origin coincides with the absolute Nothing. This is a 
coincidentia oppositorum of  a distinctive kind, since it lies solely in 
“activity.” If  one wished to fixate both forms of  Nothing as results 
of  this activity, i.e., as completed and ready thoughts, their unifica-
tion would be inconceivable. The formation of  the A of  Creation 
occurs exclusively in actu; in actuality, the A comes into being from 
Nothing, namely as the placement of  a content within nature 
(Naturinhalt) over against its own absolute destructedness, i.e., anni-
hilation, in the uniqueness of  God. This is the “genuine true 
Nothing of  Not” (das echte wahre Nichts des Nicht), which for Cohen 
arises via “annulment, or better annihilation,” as formulated already 
in the Logic of  Pure Knowledge (LrE 107). This Nothing in particular 
makes of  Creation more than the methodological thought of  a 
religiously underpinned natural science. The Being of  God places 
the world over against the possibility of  its own radical Non-Being. 
In religious discourse, this means: God creates from this Nothing, 
and in derivable contrast to it. The Annihilation at the beginning 
of  the formation of  content generates the nihil of  a creatio ex nihilo 
in the framework of  the logic of  Creation. Yet at the same time, the 
second mode of  the relative Nothing, grounded in the logic of  
Origin, retains its validity. Religious reflection is also under the 
critical Authority of  justification of  logical-scientific reason. And in 
Cohen’s view, this does not permit a something to spring forth ex 
nihilo, but rather in any case “ab nihilo” (LrE 84)—i.e., a new forma-
tion establishing continuity as a detour via the relative Nothing of  
31 Gordin, Untersuchungen, 68.
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Origin. Cohen even wishes to assert that the Hebrew word that 
“seems to correspond to Nothing (’ayin)” does not at all mean “the 
Nothing as such, but rather the relative infinitude of  privation. But 
this lies [. . .] only within the divine unique Being.”32 To use concepts 
from religious tradition, a Creation “in the beginning” stands side 
by side with a continuous “renewal of  the world (hiddush ha-‘olam).”33 
Both have equal weight: the statement that “In the beginning God 
created the heaven and earth” (Gen 1:1), and the extolling of  God 
in the daily morning prayer as the one “Who renews in his goodness 
continually each day again [and again] the work of  the beginning.”34 
The religious fusion of  these two forms of  Nothing via the unique-
ness of  God split open once again, and no discursive logic is able 
to bring this split into a conceptual unity. The ab nihilo demanded 
by the logic of  Origin of  uniqueness stands side by side with the ex 
nihilo induced by the function of  separation and protection of  the 
“Authority of  Annihilation.”
32 My translation, from RV 76 (cf. RoR 66).
33 See RoR 68 (RV 78–79); on Creation from Nothing, see RoR 63 (RV 72).
34 Quoted in RoR 68 (RV 78).
